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U.C.A. 76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
A. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another. 
U.C.A. 76-2-103 (3),(4) 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The trial court dismissed the 'manslaughter' charge here at the preliminary 
hearing stage. The trial court found particularly that no evidence was introduced to 
make a finding of reckless conduct as required. The issue presented here is whether 
the trial court's findings should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant was accused of manslaughter, which required to the State to 
prove at the preliminary hearing that the defendant's conduct was reckless as defined 
by statute. The evidence here suggests that this matter was a unfortunate accident 
but did not raise to the level of reckless conduct. A gun misfired for unknown 
reasons of which the defendant and the police have limited knowledge. The State 
failed to produce evidence to suggest that the defendant was consciously aware of the 
risk of the gun misfiring and that he consciously disregard the risk. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 9, 2000, the defendant came home and joined his sister-in-law in the 
living room. They were watching television and drinking some beers. R.36. L. 10. 
The victim had purchased the beer and she had consumed about four of the six beers. 
R. 11 L. 6. Other family members had been in the room but had left the two of 
them alone at some time. R. 11 L. 12. The two continued to drink and watch 
television. 
At about 1:15 a.m., the defendant retrieved the gun from a closet at the 
victim's request. R. 11 L. 18/ R. 13 L. 1. He handed it to the her and she was 
looking and handling the gun. R. 12 L. 17. He heard her activate the slide and this 
caught his attention. R. 12 L. 19. He asked for the gun back and she gave it back to 
him. R. 12 L. 21. There was nothing that would suggest that she had activated a 
round or that the gun was loaded. R . 13 L. 2. He then set back down. 
It appeared that the gun was jammed or some material caused it to not shut 
fully. R. 13 L. 10. As a result, he pulled the slide back and a full round was ejected 
from the gun. He did this to clear in live ammunition. R. 13 L. 11 evidencing to him 
that the gun was then safe. 
He remembers sitting on the love seat but he was not sure if the gun was at his 
hand if it was resting on his leg. R. 13 L. 20. He next remembers a bang. R. 13 L. 
22. He then looked over and saw the victim slumped over. R. 13 L. 24. 
There was nothing to indicate that the gun was load or in a firing position. 
R.14 L. 12. He had assumed that it was empty and did not have a round in the 
chamber and it didn't have a clip in the gun. R. 15 L. 1. He believed the gun was 
safe. R. 15 L. 3. 
The officer reports that there was nothing to suggest any criminal intent. R. 16 
L. 24. The officer advised that from the information he obtained there was nothing 
suggesting that he knew the gun was loaded or had a bullet in the chamber. R. 17 L. 
4. The officer testified that the gun appeared to have been jammed. R. 18 L. 1. He 
referred to another officer, more of an expert in firearms, and the second officer 
reported that the gun was jammed. R. 18 L. 10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The State charged the defendant with manslaughter. This required some 
evidence that the defendant was consciously aware the gun in this case would misfire and 
he consciously disregarded the risk. The evidence in the case suggest by the testimony of 
the State's sole witness that this was an accident and the defendant did not know of the 
risks of the gun misfiring. The officer's herein suggest that it was an unfortunate accident 
and that the defendant had no knowledge of any risk that the gun would misfire. 
The State argues that this Court should take some limited facts and make 
inferences to suggest knowledge. The State then argues that these inferences should 
override the direct evidence from the police that the defendant did not possess such 
knowledge. 
ARGUMENT 
To bind a defendant over for trial, statutorily the State must show probable 
cause at a preliminan hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226. 1229 (Utah 1995); Evans \ . State. 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998). 
Although the burden is low for the State, they must produce enough evidence 
sufficient to surv ive a motion for directed verdict with respect to each element of the 
crime." State \ . Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998 The prosecution, at a minimum, 
must establish a prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could 
conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d at 
1229.). Here the critical element is recklessness. The State failed to produce believable 
evidence of recklessness. The testimony from the State's sole witness supported the fact 
that this was an unfortunate accident and was not reckless behavior. 
A trial court should dismiss the charge, as here, if the State did not establish a 
prima facie case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992); See 
also State \ . Smith. 
The prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief 
that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. This "reasonable 
belief standard allows the magistrate to fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary 
hearing of ferreting out groundless and improvident prosecutions. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 
783-84: State v. Clark. 2001 Ut 9. 20 P.3d 300. 
Application to Case. 
The defendant was accused of manslaughter in that he "did recklessly cause the 
death of another* in \ iolation of U.C.A. 76-5-505 and not negligent homicide. The 
State's burden then was to demonstrate a reckless state of mind and not negligence. 
The U.C.A. 76-2-12 defines both reckless and criminal negligence as follows: 
(3) Recklessh. or maliciously, with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but conscioush disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint 
B\ the State charging this offense as reckless conduct required the State to prove 
that the defendant Was aware9 of the risk and consciously choose' to disregard the risks. 
This is as opposed to a criminal negligence standard of which requires that he 'ought to 
be aware*. 
The State agrees that there is an obligation to give evidence of the 1) subjective 
and 2) objective components of the defendant's perception of the risk. They suggest that 
they had to prove that the defendant was aware of the risks and secondly he consciously 
disregarded the same. This conforms to the holdings in State v. Standiford, 769 P. 2d 
254 (Utah 1988). 
The State argues that the evidence reflects that the defendant was aware of the 
specific risks. The State argues that the Court should infer such a finding. The basis for 
such finding being the defendant retrieving the gun from the victim and that he knew the 
gun was mechanicalh amiss. They then suggest that he replaced the bullet in the clip. 
(However, the clip was not in the gun.). The inference suggested would have to then 
override the direct evidence elicited from the one witness Officer Grothe. This would 
also override the inference that the gun was safe since he cleared the action of the gun by 
discharging the bullet. 
Grothe spoke to these issues directly. 
Officer Grothe testified that the defendant did not know that the gun was loaded. 
The transcript reports the following: 
R. 14 
Q. Detective, what did he tell you that would make you think that he knew 
that the gun was loaded or in a firing position? R. 14 L. 12. 
A. There was nothing that made him think that. L. 15 
Q. He didn't think it was loaded? L. 16 
A.No.L.H 
Contrary to the State's position, the clip was not in the gun. 
R.15. 
Q. There was no clip in the gun. L.4 
A. That's what he stated. L. 5 
Q. He advised \ou that the gun was safe. L 6. 
A. Yes. L. 7. 
The officer agreed that this was mereh an accident. 
R.16 
Q. Would it be fair to describe this, that this was an accident? L. 21. 
A. Yeah L. 23. 
Specifically regarding the gun being loaded, the officer advised: 
R.17 
Q. And >ou"re telling me from your information you've gathered that he did not 
know the gun w as loaded or had a bullet in the firing chamber? L. 1 
A. Yes. L.4. 
Q. What information do you have to suggest that Mr. Robinson knewr the gun to 
have live ammunition in it that could be fire? L. 14 
A. There was no information that I have that would have confirmed for sure the 
he knew that it was loaded. L. 21. 
Q. Did you make any examination of the gun as to its malfunctioning abilities, 
or how—was it function properly? Was there any reason to explain why that 
bullet would be in that firing position? L. 22. 
R.18 
A. I'm not a gun expert per se. but from what I saw, it appeared that it had been 
jammed. It was a round that had been spent that was in the process of being 
ejected out of the gun and got jammed in there. Detective Orndorff, who is 
much more skilled person in firearms, he's an instructor, and he looked at the gun 
closer than I did. L. 1 
Q. What information did Detective Orndorff give you? 
A. Other than what I just said. I don't recall any. 
Q. That it \\ as jammed? 
A. Yeah. L. 10. 
The State's direct evidence produce evidence of negligence at best. It failed to 
produce any evidence that the defendant was consciously aware of the risk and 
conscioush disregarded the same. The magistrate may have the obligation to look 
favorabK upon the State's evidence but it has no obligation to go into legal contortions to 
find probable cause. The Magistrate need not make inferences when contradicted by 
direct testimon>. 
CONCLUSION 
The State has a low burden of proof at the preliminary hearing level but it still 
does have a burden. The State still must satisfy each and every element of the charge 
with some quantum of believable evidence. 
However, a magistrate is not required to go to such extremes as would require 
him/her to override direct testimony of a witness by drawing some inferences that may be 
possible but speculate e. The judge still has a job to do and he/she is not simply a slave to 
the State's wishes. If the direct testimony states that the defendant did not know of the 
risk, the magistrate should not be overturned b\ a speculative inference. 
Respectfully submitted this 6lh day of August 
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